Abstract. For the purpose of distinguishing between mutualism and reciprocity in nature, recent work on the evolution of cooperation has both oversimplifed and undersimplified the distinction between these two categories of cooperation. This article addresses the resulting issues of model testability, clarifies the role of time and argues that the category of 'pseudo-reciprocity' is an unnecessary complication.
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The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour
The problem of cooperation has intrigued biologists since at least the time of Darwin, with different categories of cooperation in favour at different times. Crudely speaking, mutualism and group selection have found more favour in the first half of this century, and kin selection and reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) have found more favour in the second (Mitman 1992; Dugatkin 1997) . In general, the conspicuousness (or inconspicuousness) of a particular category of cooperation has had less to do with established frequency in nature than with the intuition of influential biologists, for example that of Hamilton (1964) on kin selection or Williams (1966) on group selection. In particular, by arguing that reciprocal altruism may be common in nature, Axelrod & Hamilton (1981) have strongly influenced research on the evolution of cooperation, to such an extent that reciprocal altruism has been virtually synonymous with cooperation throughout the 1980s and into the present decade, while the other three categories of cooperation have been downplayed (Dugatkin et al. 1992; Mesterton-Gibbons & Dugatkin 1992) . Despite this bias, however, there are few proven cases of reciprocal altruism: most acknowledged instances of cooperation in nature remain open to several interpretations (Dugatkin 1997).
It is therefore refreshing in the recent literature to find mutualism back in vogue, as exemplified not only by Clements & Stephens (1995) but also by a more recent debate between Connor (1996) , Dugatkin (1996) and Milinski (1996) on whether predator inspection is reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) or 'by-product mutualism' (Brown 1983) . Accepting that mutualism and reciprocity are both viable explanations of cooperative behaviour is a crucial first step towards distinguishing between them. A crucial next step, following Albert Einstein's dictum, is to make the problem of mutualism versus reciprocity as simple as possible, but no simpler. Recent literature falls short on both counts. Not only has the problem been oversimplified, through neglect of temporal factors in distinguishing between mutualism and reciprocity, but it has also been undersimplified, through introducing a redundant additional category of cooperation. The purpose of this paper is to clarify these issues, which in essence are both issues of model testability. We begin with the issue of time. Throughout, we exclude both kin-selected and group-selected cooperation from consideration (see Discussion); moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we use mutualism as a synonym for by-product mutualism and reciprocity as a synonym for reciprocal altruism.
THE ROLE OF TIME
Any economic analysis of animal behaviour is meaningless without reference to time scales for
